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A growing literature in economics examines the role of human resource
practices in determining ﬁrm performance. One strand of this literature
has focused on how compensation design can aﬀect employee incentives
and through them, a ﬁrm’s success. Fringe beneﬁts are an important share
of compensation, and economists have long studied the role of pensions
and health insurance in labor markets, but have devoted relatively little at-
tention to how decisions about beneﬁts might interact with ﬁrm perfor-
mance. Our aim here is to pull together these issues by examining how pro-
viding part of compensation to employees in the form of beneﬁts interacts
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reau. (Jeremy.S.Wu@census.gov, http://lehd.did.census.gov/).with a ﬁrm’s human capital stock, and further, how this choice is related to
ﬁrm productivity, growth, and survival. Clearly, whether and what sort of
beneﬁts to oﬀer is not given exogenously, but is a decision that will depend
in part on ﬁrm performance. Our goal is not to establish causality, but
rather to map out correlations among these variables as a building block
for future work in this area.
We approach these issues using a very rich data set that combines ad-
ministrative data on beneﬁt plans from IRS Form 5500 with the Longitu-
dinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) integrated employer-
employee data. These data have many unique characteristics that allow us
to explore how ﬁrm productivity, growth, and survival are related to bene-
ﬁt oﬀering in a way that has not been possible before. Each data source pro-
vides a piece of the overall picture. The data from IRS Form 5500 provide
us with the means to identify which employers oﬀer beneﬁt packages, as
well as some information about the type of beneﬁts oﬀered. These public
ﬁlings cover most types of tax-preferred beneﬁts, enabling us to character-
ize the beneﬁt oﬀerings of a much broader group of employers than would
be possible with survey data.
The ﬁrm-level data, drawn from the Census Business Register and State
ES-202 data, report other ﬁrm characteristics such as ﬁrm size, industry,
number of establishments, and a longitudinal measure of ﬁrm life span.
The worker-level data, drawn from State Unemployment Insurance (UI)
wage records, inform us about which workers are employed by which ﬁrms
in a quarter and give us some basic demographic characteristics of those
workers.
These links between workers and ﬁrms allow us to follow the movement
of workers between ﬁrms and in and out of the labor market over time.
These longitudinal links provide us with measures of human capital and
ﬁrm compensation practices that are of key interest to questions about
beneﬁt oﬀering. They also give us measures of the number of workers join-
ing and leaving each employer’s workforce, providing us with more de-
tailed data on the amount of employee turnover than is available from ei-
ther ﬁrm- or worker-level data alone. Employers’ compensation choices
are driven both by the characteristics of their businesses and the workforce
that they choose to employ. By integrating these three diﬀerent types of
data—beneﬁt oﬀerings, ﬁrm characteristics, and worker ﬂows—we are
able to examine the whole picture. Because the data sources we draw on
cover populations rather than samples, we can use a very rich combination
of measures while retaining a reasonably large and representative
sample—something that is very diﬃcult to obtain when combining data
from several surveys. We use these data to measure how ﬁrm choices about
compensation packages are correlated with a ﬁrm’s workforce turnover
and growth and how both of these are in turn correlated with ﬁrm out-
comes.
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erature that we build on and present a framework for thinking about our
estimation. We discuss data issues in some detail in section 13.3, and then
present results in section 13.4. Section 13.5 summarizes our results.
13.2 Background
As background for our empirical work, we brieﬂy review related work on
human resource practices and ﬁrm performance to give a context for our
approach. Following that we provide a framework for our estimation.
13.2.1 How do Firms Use Beneﬁts to Shape 
Their Human Capital Stock?
In hedonic wage models, workers face a continuum of diﬀerent compen-
sation packages given by the envelope of ﬁrms’ varying wage/beneﬁt iso-
proﬁt lines.1 In response to this set of choices they sort themselves into
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. Variation in workers’ willingness to trade oﬀ wages
for beneﬁts leads to sorting of workers into ﬁrms on the basis of fringe ben-
eﬁt oﬀerings. In this model, sorting matches workers with their preferred
compensation package and minimizes employers’ costs of employing labor.
Workers vary in their willingness to trade oﬀ wages for beneﬁts because
of diﬀerences in factors such as marginal tax rates, age, and rates of time
preference. Firms that need skills held mainly by young workers, for ex-
ample, might make themselves more attractive to the employees they wish
to hire and keep by oﬀering higher wages and no beneﬁts, if young work-
ers have a lower willingness to trade oﬀ cash wages for fringes. The relative
cost of fringe beneﬁts may vary across ﬁrms because of economies of scale
in providing beneﬁts or varying access to particular types of fringe plans.
For example, large ﬁrms may have lower costs of providing beneﬁts be-
cause of the cost advantages of pooling across a large group of employ-
ees. As Montgomery and Shaw (1992) point out, any direct productivity-
enhancing eﬀects of beneﬁts will also alter the ﬁrm side of this trade oﬀ, 
increasing the cost eﬀectiveness of fringes relative to wages.
Alternatively, dual labor market theory posits that there are two sectors:
one with rationed good jobs that pay well and have good fringe beneﬁts,
and a second with bad jobs having low pay and few beneﬁts (Bulow and
Summers 1986; Dickens and Lang 1985). Sorting in this model need not 
reﬂect diﬀerences in the costs of providing beneﬁts, nor in willingness to
trade oﬀ wages for fringes. Similarly, eﬃciency wage models also generate
an equilibrium in which workers with the same productive characteristics
would have jobs with diﬀerent levels of compensation that might include
diﬀerent beneﬁts.
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1. For example, as in the standard textbook by Ehrenberg and Smith (1996, p. 247).A long literature has documented that both pensions and health insur-
ance are associated with a workforce with lower turnover. Economists have
found a negative relationship between pensions and quit rates for both de-
ﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned contribution (DC) plans.2 In the case of 
DB plans, implicit contract theory has been the primary framework used
to interpret this pattern: a loss of pension wealth penalizes workers who
break their implicit contract by leaving prior to retirement. This compen-
sation structure leads to self-selection so that ﬁrms oﬀering pensions end
up with a workforce made up of stayers, which is what motivates oﬀering
the DB plan.
Ippolito (2002) oﬀers an alternative explanation. One problem for im-
plicit contract theory has been the ﬁnding that quit rates are low for ﬁrms
oﬀering DC plans as well as those oﬀering DB plans, despite the fact that
DC plans impose much smaller quitting costs (Gustman and Steinmeier
1993 and 1995; Even and Macpherson 1996; Ippolito 2002). Ippolito argues
that quit rates are low because pensions in general attract savers, and that
those who save at a higher rate also have lower quit propensities. His 2002
paper expands on earlier work (Ippolito 1997) that argues that having a low
discount rate makes both saving and staying more attractive, so pensions
are one method of attracting those with low discount rates who may also
have higher productivity. He presents evidence that those with characteris-
tics that might be correlated with a low discount rate are more likely to have
a pension, and are also more likely to have high performance ratings.
An alternative explanation for low quit rates under pension plans is that
ﬁrms with pensions have higher total compensation than ﬁrms without,
and that the diﬀerence in compensation accounts for lower turnover (Gust-
man and Steinmeier 1995; Even and Macpherson 2001). Gustman and
Steinmeier (1995) point out that compensation diﬀerences would help ex-
plain some other puzzles as well—why the reduction in turnover associated
with pensions is largest for young workers, for whom the associated pen-
sion losses are small, and why the reduction appears to occur primarily
through fewer layoﬀs rather than through fewer quits.
If beneﬁts play an important role in ﬁrms’ compensation strategies,
there ought to be measurable eﬀects on ﬁrm outcomes such as productiv-
ity, ﬁrm growth, and survival. Such eﬀects may come about indirectly
through changes in the recruitment and retention of labor. But beneﬁts
may also aﬀect productivity more directly by altering employees’ incen-
tives to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge or by reducing turnover and
training costs (Even and Macpherson 2001). There is little existing empir-
ical evidence on the relationship between beneﬁts oﬀering and productiv-
ity. One exception is work by Dorsey, Cornwell, and Macpherson (1998)
using Compustat data to estimate eﬀects of DB plans on productivity us-
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2. See, for example, the review in Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994).ing a production function framework. They ﬁnd evidence of higher labor
productivity in ﬁrms with DB plans, but the evidence on overall produc-
tivity eﬀects is mixed.
13.2.2 Schematic Framework for Our Empirical Work
Our starting point is to posit that productivity is a function of a ﬁrm’s
human capital stock (HC) and other inputs (Z).
(1) lnYit   f(HCit, Zit)   εit.
We assume that the composition of compensation aﬀects productivity
through its eﬀects on the human capital stock. A traditional representation
of the evolution of a capital stock is useful in considering the mechanisms
through which this might happen:
(2) HCit   (1    it)HCi,t 1   Iit
where HCit represents the human capital stock of employer i at time t, and
Iit represents investment. Investment in human capital happens through
accessions (new hires) and on-the-job acquisition of skill by current em-
ployees. Depreciation occurs both through employee separations and
through deterioration or obsolescence of employees’ skills. Because we
cannot measure on-the-job investment or the deterioration of skills, we fo-
cus on how compensation practices aﬀect accessions and separations. We
do so by running a series of regressions to examine diﬀerences in churning
(turnover in excess of that needed to grow or shrink a ﬁrm) and net em-
ployment growth for beneﬁt- and non-beneﬁt-providing employers. If ben-
eﬁt provision is correlated with lower churning and net employment
growth or stability, this will support the ﬁndings of previous studies that
beneﬁts are associated with lower turnover.
We then come back to equation (1), and estimate the correlation be-
tween output and changes in HC by running a series of productivity re-
gressions. Our ability to measure the other inputs, Z, is quite limited. Out-
side of manufacturing, we have no direct measures of other inputs, so we
rely on controls for industry, location, and size to capture some of these
eﬀects. We are in somewhat better shape in manufacturing where we can at
least measure capital-labor ratios and the use of materials, so we present
some of our productivity results for manufacturing alone. A positive cor-
relation between beneﬁts and productivity will support the hypothesis that
ﬁrms are choosing beneﬁt packages to attract and retain high quality
workers, or at least workers whose skills closely match the ﬁrm’s needs. Fi-
nally, using the data we have developed on a ﬁrm’s human capital stock,
productivity, and beneﬁts, we look at what relationship fringe beneﬁt com-
pensation has with a longer run ﬁrm outcome—the likelihood of ﬁrm fail-
ure. We estimate hazards of ﬁrm death to examine how the human capital
stock, productivity, and fringe beneﬁt compensation are correlated with
The Role of Fringe Beneﬁts in Employer and Workforce Dynamics 477ﬁrm survival. A positive correlation between longer ﬁrm life and beneﬁt
provision will be consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁrms gain real advan-
tage from choosing a compensation package that involves pensions and
health insurance, though it could also be that expected ﬁrm success makes
employers more willing to oﬀer beneﬁts.
13.3 Data
Our estimates are based on a very rich database that we created by com-
bining data from several sources. It consists of microdata on whether a
business provided beneﬁts, detail on the types of beneﬁts provided, work-
force composition, turnover, the distribution of worker earnings, and labor
productivity. Much of this data is also longitudinal, allowing us to measure
changes in beneﬁt oﬀerings, and ﬁrm survival and growth.
13.3.1 Dataset Construction
The database combines information from ﬁve sources:
• Firm reports on beneﬁt plans oﬀered to employees (the Internal Rev-
enue Service/Department of Labor Form 5500 ﬁle)
• The Census Bureau’s Business Register (BR)
• Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage record data from seven states
• The Census NUMIDENT ﬁle
• The Economic Census
Beneﬁt information comes from Form 5500 annual reports on employee
beneﬁt plans ﬁled by the plan sponsor (usually the employer). These public
ﬁlings are required under ERISA for most types of tax-preferred beneﬁts,
with some exemptions for small health plans. Here we use data on plans
that end in 1997 and 2001, drawing from the 1996/1997 and 2000/2001 data
ﬁles. The Form 5500 collects information about employer-provided pen-
sions (deﬁned beneﬁt and various types of deﬁned contribution plans),
welfare plans (health, life, supplemental unemployment, and disability in-
surance plans) and fringe beneﬁt plans (cafeteria or ﬂexible beneﬁt plans
and educational assistance plans).3In addition to variables describing plan
features, the data also include name, address, and a federal Employer Iden-
tiﬁcation Number (EIN) for the plan sponsor. Employer Identiﬁcation
Numbers (EINs) are also used in a wide variety of other employer tax ﬁl-
ings, including those underlying the Census Bureau’s business list and the
UI wage record data.
Figure 13.1describes how the data set is constructed. The 5500 ﬁle is ﬁrst
integrated with Census’s Business Register (BR) using sponsor EINs. The
BR is a list of all private establishments with paid employment that is con-
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3. See appendix table 13A.1 for a listing of the beneﬁt plan types and the associated fre-
quencies among 1997 plans in the 5500 ﬁles.structed from a variety of administrative and survey sources, but its back-
bone is quarterly employment tax ﬁlings that include EINs.4 Census uses
the quinquennial economic censuses and the annual Company Organiza-
tion Survey in constructing the BR to break out diﬀerent business loca-
tions that may be ﬁled under a single EIN. Many large ﬁrms use more than
one EIN, so these survey sources, in combination with administrative data,
also identify EINs that are aﬃliated through parent-subsidiary relation-
ships.
We do an initial match of the list of 5500 EINs to the BR. If a 5500 EIN
matches to part of a multi-location ﬁrm, we use information on company
structure from the BR to identify any other EINs (and aﬃliated establish-
ments) that belong to the same company. One diﬃcult question is whether
a particular beneﬁt is in fact oﬀered at all establishments belonging to a
company. Here, we treat all parts of a company as oﬀering beneﬁts if at
least one EIN belonging to that company matches to the 5500 ﬁle.
Our next step is to bring in the UI data. These data are described exten-
sively elsewhere (Burgess, Lane and Stevens 2000), but we note several
salient characteristics here. First, they include longitudinal data on both
ﬁrms and workers from the mid-1990s to 2003, which permits an analysis
of the dynamics of employment ﬂows, workforce change, and ﬁrm entry
and exit over this period. Second, because earnings data are available for
individual workers at each of their employing ﬁrms, it is possible to analyze
both earnings and employment outcomes for workers in each business. Fi-
nally, the data are almost universal in nature, capturing some 98 percent of
employment in each state for which the data are collected. The results pre-
sented here include data for seven states.
Although the UI wage record data are very rich in terms of sample size
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Fig. 13.1 Schemata for construction of database
4. The BR was historically known as the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL).
An establishment is deﬁned as a single physical location where business is conducted or where
services or industrial operations are performed.and coverage, they lack demographic information on workers. Limited de-
mographic information is obtained by matching the UI records with inter-
nal administrative records (the Census NUMIDENT ﬁle) that have infor-
mation on date of birth, place of birth, race and sex for all workers. About
96 percent of the records in each state’s UI wage data can be matched to
this source.5
In addition, we make use of human capital measures constructed by
other LEHD researchers. The LEHD staﬀ (as described in Abowd,
Lengermann, and McKinney [2002], henceforth ALM) have estimated
ﬁxed eﬀects for individual ﬁrms and workers based on the following wage
equation:
(3) ln (wijt)   xit    i   ψj(i,t)   εijt
where  iis a ﬁxed worker eﬀect, ψj(i,t) is a ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀect, and j(i,t) indexes
the ﬁrm j for which worker i works at time t. Ln (wijt) represents the log of
full-time earnings, so the ﬁxed eﬀects  i and ψj(i,t) are in terms of log earn-
ings diﬀerences. This decomposition provides a measure of the ﬁxed,
portable component of worker i’s skills ( i), and a measure of the ﬁxed pre-
mium (or discount) that ﬁrm j pays after accounting for worker skills
(ψj(i,t)).
In our empirical results we use the following as a measure of general hu-
man capital:
(4) hit   xit    i
where xit consists of quarters of work experience interacted with race and
gender. As described in ALM, a seven-state distribution of hit was created
and individual workers were classiﬁed according to their location in this
distribution. Summary-level statistics for ﬁrms were created by calculating
the percentage of workers at each ﬁrm that belonged to each quartile of the
overall human-capital distribution. In this work, we have these measures
for 1997 only.
Finally, we bring in measures of labor productivity based on data from
the 1997 Economic Census (EC). We measure labor productivity as the
logarithm of sales per employee deviated from the two-digit industry
mean. For multi-unit ﬁrms, we aggregate establishment-level data from the
EC to the state-EIN-two-digit SIC level before matching to the 5500/UI
data. For each multi-unit ﬁrm we deﬁne a primary SIC by aggregating pay-
roll across establishments within a state that have the same two-digit SIC
code, and then taking the SIC code associated with the largest aggregated
payroll.6
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5. See Staﬀ of the LEHD Program (2002) for further discussion.
6. Because at the time of writing data were not yet available from the 2002 Economic Cen-
sus, we do not have longitudinal data on productivity.13.3.2 Data Coverage Issues—5500/Business Register Match
In the results that follow, we use the presence of a matching record in the
5500 ﬁle as an indicator that a ﬁrm oﬀers beneﬁts and then use additional
information from the ﬁle to determine what sorts of beneﬁts are oﬀered.
Whether these are reasonably accurate measures depends ﬁrst on the ﬁling
requirements for the Form 5500 (e.g., do all plans in fact appear in this data
set?) and secondly on our success in matching an employer to the 5500 data
set when it in fact contains information on the employer’s beneﬁt plan(s).
We brieﬂy describe these issues here; they are more fully documented in
Decressin et al. (2005).
Filing requirements diﬀer somewhat for pensions and other types of
plans (welfare or fringe beneﬁt plans). For pensions, only a few specialized
types of plans are exempt from the requirement to ﬁle.7 However, welfare
and fringe plans with fewer than 100 participants are exempt if they are ei-
ther unfunded (i.e., the employer pays the costs out of general funds) and/
or fully insured through an insurance provider (e.g., a Blue Cross/Blue
Shield company). Thus, most small health plans are probably not included
in the 5500 ﬁle. Where we focus on beneﬁts in general, the ﬁrms for whom
we mismeasure beneﬁt oﬀering are those who oﬀer a small health plan but
no pension plan.
For most plans, employer and sponsor are one and the same, and inte-
gration of 5500 data with the BR is straightforward. However, for plans
that involve multiple employers the sponsor EIN generally belongs to an
entity other than one of the participating employers. For example, a trade
union might sponsor a Taft-Hartley pension plan for unionized electri-
cians working for many diﬀerent employers. Given that we cannot identify
which employers are involved with our current resources, we drop those
plans in what follows.
Some employers oﬀer more than one beneﬁt plan, so we summarize
plan-level information associated with the same EIN before matching to
the BR.8 Ninety-seven percent of the 731,609 EINs in our 1997 Form 5500
extract can be found on the 1997 BR. Limiting our analysis to records in
the BR that meet our criteria for being active and in-scope gives us a match
rate of 90 percent for the 5500 EINs in 1997 and 89 percent for the EINs in
2001.9 The fraction of ﬁrms on the BR that match to a plan in the 5500 ﬁle
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7. Simpliﬁed Employee Pension (SEP) plans are exempt, as are Savings Incentive Match
Plans for Employees (SIMPLE) if they take the form of an IRA (but not SIMPLE 401(k)
plans). Both plans can be used only by employers with at most 100 eligible employees. SEP
plans do not allow for employee contributions, and employer contributions must be a ﬁxed
percentage of pay up to a maximum. Church plans are also exempt.
8. Thirty percent of EINs in 1997 are associated with two or more plan ﬁlings.
9. The BR records that we exclude from matching either do not report any payroll for the
current year or have codes that indicate that they should be outside the scope of our investi-
gation (e.g., they are government-owned entities, which are not required to ﬁle Form 5500, oris much lower. As tables 13.1 and 13.2 illustrates in 1997, only 11 percent
(9.4 percent in 2001) of the 5.7 million businesses in the 1997 Census Busi-
ness Register have a match to a 5500 form, but the vast majority of com-
panies that do not match to the Form 5500 data are in fact very small. The
match rates in 2001 are similar to the ones in 1997, but usually a little
lower.10 Because we have a wider variety of data available in 1997 than in
2001 and we would like to be as consistent as possible across tables, in the
following most statistics are only presented for 1997.
The low overall match rate simply reﬂects the predominance of ﬁrms with
few employees in the overall count of ﬁrms. Of the nonmatches in 1997, 54
percent have ﬁve or fewer employees, and an additional 23 percent have 
between six and twenty-ﬁve employees. Large ﬁrms (≥ 100 employees) ac-
count for only 0.5 percent of all nonmatches compared to 13 percent of all
matches. Larger ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀer beneﬁts and are also more
likely to be required to ﬁle Form 5500, given that they oﬀer plans. Thus, it is
encouraging that the majority of large ﬁrms in the Business Register can be
matched to a Form 5500 ﬁling. Because of ﬁling exemptions and diﬃculties
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represent a trust rather than an employer). The 11 percent of EINs in 1997 that match to these
sorts of BR records might match to adjacent years of the BR, or may provide information on
what sorts of plans we do not accurately match—both possibilities we plan to investigate in
future work. Extensive documentation of the matching exercise is provided in Decressin, Mc-
Cue, and Stinson (2003).
10. The data for the 1997 match did receive a much bigger data cleaning eﬀort than the 2001
data and this might have caused better match numbers for 1997.
Table 13.1 Business register match rates to 1997, 5500 data
Single-unit ﬁrms Multi-unit ﬁrms All ﬁrms
Number of  Match  Match  Match 
employees Number rate (%) Number rate (%) Number rate (%)
Missing or 0 955,116 1.5 2,880 16.6 957,996 1.5
1–4 2,624,082 4.1 7,728 15.4 2,631,810 4.1
5–99 1,918,184 19.5 139,724 47.2 2,057,908 21.3
100–999 44,708 62.3 44,166 78.5 88,874 70.4
1,000  1,130 74.3 7,074 92.6 8,204 90.1
Total 5,543,220 9.5 201,572 54.0 5,744,792 11.0
Notes: Employment data on the BR come primarily from ﬁlings of IRS Form 941, which is
used to report quarterly withholding of payroll and income taxes. Businesses are also asked
to report employment on these forms, but the employment data are not as complete as the
payroll data. We include only ﬁrms with positive payroll in the table (and the match), but some
of these ﬁrms do not report any employment. This could be because the employment ques-
tion asks about a particular week in the quarter and the ﬁrm had no employees on the pay-
roll that week, or it may be that ﬁrms neglected to report employment, which is not directly
tied to the tax liability. Employment data used in the estimation section is taken from the 
UI data.in matching, we expect coverage to be incomplete for small ﬁrms and in in-
dustries with large numbers of Taft-Hartley plans. In some of what follows
we present results for manufacturing alone (which has little Taft-Hartley
coverage) or for the sample of ﬁrms with at least 100 employees.
If we weight these match rates by employment (see table 13A.2), ﬁrms in
1997 that match to the 5500 ﬁle employ 66 percent of all workers (70 mil-
lion out of the 106 million in the 1997 workforce). The corresponding num-
ber for 2001 is 64 percent. Among multi-units the match rate is even higher:
90 percent of workers in 1997 are employed by matching ﬁrms (89 percent
in 2001), compared with 36 percent for single-unit ﬁrms (32 percent in
2001).
Table 13.3gives the distribution of type of plans among ﬁrms that match
to at least one plan in 1997. A very large share of ﬁrms with some sort of
matched beneﬁt oﬀer a pension plan, regardless of size. This probably re-
ﬂects the fact that coverage of beneﬁts by Form 5500 ﬁlings is most com-
plete for pensions. The most notable size eﬀect is for health plans, for which
the percent oﬀering a health plan is substantially larger for ﬁrms with
greater than 100 employees. This appears to reﬂect the exemption from ﬁl-
ing for most health plans with fewer than 100 enrollees.
Comparing beneﬁt coverage rates implied by our matched data to na-
tional survey estimates suggests that we do quite well in matching pension
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Table 13.2 Business Register Match Rates to 2001, 5500 Data
Single-unit ﬁrms Multi-unit ﬁrms All ﬁrms
Number of  Match  Match  Match 
employees Number rate (%) Number rate (%) Number rate (%)
Missing or 0 929,468 1.3% 3,117 18.7% 932,585 1.37%
1 – 4 2,686,090 3.3% 6,052 15.5% 2,692,142 3.36%
5 – 99 2,051,445 16.6% 101,799 43.0% 2,153,244 17.81%
100 – 999 53,590 54.9% 40,807 74.4% 94,397 63.32%
1000   1,495 62.1% 7,312 90.1% 8,807 85.35%
Total 5,722,088 8.2% 159,087 51.7% 5,881,175 9.42%
Table 13.3 Types of plans found for matched employers, by ﬁrm size—1997
Number of employees Pension (%) Health (%) Other fringe (%)
1–50 87 2 24
51–100 85 7 52
101–250 86 28 55
251–750 88 57 59
750  92 80 72
Total 87 7 30coverage but that we understate health coverage by even more than we
would have expected. In our data for 1997, 61 percent of employees work
for businesses that oﬀer pension beneﬁts, while 34 percent work for busi-
nesses that oﬀer health beneﬁts. BLS survey estimates from 2003 indicate
that 57 percent of employees have access to retirement beneﬁts. This ﬁgure
excludes employees who have not met minimum length of service require-
ments and so would be expected to be somewhat below our estimate, which
implicitly includes them.11
In contrast, a 1997 survey estimated that 86 percent of employees work
for establishments that oﬀer health beneﬁts—more than twice our ﬁgure.12
We expect to understate health coverage somewhat given that certain small
health plans are not required to ﬁle, but the diﬀerence seems too large for
that to be the only problem. At the same time, we seem to ﬁnd too much
coverage under plans classiﬁed by sponsors as Fringe beneﬁt plans on the
Form 5500. This should include only Section 125 cafeteria plans (ﬂexible
beneﬁt, reimbursement, and premium conversion plans) and non-job-
related education beneﬁt plans (under Section 127 of the tax code). We ﬁnd
that 36 percent of employees in 1997 work for ﬁrms oﬀering plans classi-
ﬁed in this way, while 1999 survey estimates imply that 28 percent of em-
ployees have access to Section 125 plans and only 10 percent have access
to nonwork related educational assistance (and presumably there is con-
siderable overlap in those types of beneﬁts). Because we think that some
health insurance plans may appear in the 5500 ﬁles as Fringe beneﬁt plans,
we start with estimates based on the more general question of whether an
employer oﬀers some form of fringe beneﬁts, but we also examine how the
estimates change when we look at a breakout of beneﬁt types.
13.3.3 Sample Characteristics
While we match the 5500 data to Census’s Business Register as a whole,
most of our empirical work is based on the subset of those businesses for
which we also have UI State data. In looking at employment growth we
must also restrict our sample to ﬁrms continuing from 1997 to 2001. Before
proceeding with our results, we brieﬂy describe the diﬀerences in samples.
While the 5500/BR data exists for all ﬁfty-one states, the UI data restrict us
to look at seven states. Thus, we have data for parts of ﬁrms that operate
across multiple states, and no data for ﬁrms that operate only in other
states, which leaves us as much as 1.8 million ﬁrms operating in 1997 and
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11. It is diﬃcult to put together a comparable total coverage number for pension beneﬁts
for either 1997 or 2001 for a couple of reasons. Prior to 1999, the BLS survey that collected
data for beneﬁts estimates (the Employee Beneﬁt Survey) surveyed small and medium/large
employers in alternating years. Beginning in 1999, BLS publishes estimates for all private em-
ployers, but access numbers are not available until 2003. The 2003 estimates are available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebbl0020.pdf
12. See http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/
1997/tib2.pdf1.2 million ﬁrms operating in both 1997 and 2001 (Continuers).13 As ex-
plained in ALM, human-capital summary statistics are only created for
ﬁrms with at least ﬁve employees, due to the diﬃculty of applying kernel
density estimation techniques for calculating distributions to ﬁrms of very
small sizes. Our regressions all make use of these wage decompositions, so
we further restrict our sample to ﬁrms having at least ﬁve employees. This
reduces the sample for 1997 to almost 400,000 and for the 1997/2001 Con-
tinuers sample to a little more than 300,000. In addition, we do some of our
productivity analyses on the subset of ﬁrms that also appear in the Annual
Sample of Manufacturing (ASM) from which we derive measures of capi-
tal intensity. For 1997, this sample contained 10,263 ﬁrms.
Table 13.4 presents 1997 sample statistics for the seven-state 5500/BR/
UI data and the sample for which we also have HC estimates.14 Given that
more than 50 percent of ﬁrms in the United States have less than ﬁve em-
ployees, the reduction in sample size from column 1 to 3 is dramatic. As ex-
pected, the sample without the small ﬁrms has on average older ﬁrms and
a higher percentage of beneﬁt-oﬀering ﬁrms. The fraction of multi-unit
ﬁrms is also higher.
The statistics for 1997/2001 continuers are fairly similar to the more
comprehensive samples. The average ﬁrm labor productivity and mean
ﬁrm wage eﬀect for the sample of continuers (column [4]) is larger than for
the sample that includes all the observations in 1997 (column [3]). The last
row gives mean churning rates, which measure the rate of accessions and
separations that occur at a ﬁrm over one quarter, above and beyond those
needed to accomplish the ﬁrm’s net growth during that period.15 Net
growth is deﬁned as total employment at the end of a quarter minus total
employment at the beginning of the quarter and can be positive or nega-
tive. For ﬁrms with human capital estimates (i.e., at least ﬁve employees),
the churning rates are similar for the 1997 ﬁrms and the continuers. For the
entire sample, churning rates are lower for the continuers.
13.4 Results
13.4.1 Evolution of the Human Capital Stock
A ﬁrm that grows by one employee over a quarter may do so by simply
hiring one more employee, or by hiring ﬁve new employees and letting four
employees (new or old) go. The latter is likely to be more costly, but also
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13. The unit of observation is generally a ﬁrm/state record; that is, a multi-unit ﬁrm that op-
erates in several of the states for which we have data will have more than one record.
14. Table 13A.3 of the Appendix shows ﬁrm characteristics by beneﬁt oﬀer for the sample.
15. The formula used is (|A   S| – |E – B|) / [(B   E) / 2], where A   accessions, S   sepa-
rations, B   employment at the beginning of the quarter, and E   employment at the end of
the quarter.makes possible more dramatic changes in the total skills embodied in the
ﬁrm’s workforce—for better or worse. While we do not do a formal de-
composition, we do break our analysis into these two parts: churning and
net growth. If a ﬁrm follows the ﬁrst strategy of hiring and keeping one
more person, then net growth is one person and churning is zero. If instead
it hires ﬁve new employees and lets four go, churning is 8 (   5   4 – 1)—
the number of extra employees who arrived or left above those needed to
increase employment by one. We are interested in how both net growth and
churning relate to beneﬁt oﬀering and how these two correlations might be
diﬀerent from each other.
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Table 13.4 Characteristics of alternative samples
Data required
5,500/BR/UI data 
5,500/BR/UI data and HC estimates
Sample characteristics All 1997 Continuers All 1997 Continuers
Sample size 1,860,072 1,196,541 390,635 302,079
Oﬀer beneﬁts in 1997 only 5.44 % 4.29 % 10.52 % 7.76 %
Oﬀer beneﬁts in 2001 only 1.94 % 2.83 % 3.53 % 4.44 %
Oﬀer beneﬁts in 1997 and 2001 9.68 % 13.76 % 21.27 % 26.61 %
Mean ﬁrm wage eﬀect ψ — — –0.1049 –0.0966
Multi-unit ﬁrm 3.31 % 3.84 % 7.74 % 7.89 %
Firm age: 
 5 years old 31.88 % 28.15 % 21.64 % 18.66 %
5 to  10 years old 19.74 % 20.77 % 21.47 % 20.84 %
10 to  15 years old 13.58 % 15.33 % 17.49 % 18.04 %
15 to  20 years old 8.89 % 10.50 % 13.95 % 14.93 %
20 or more years old 14.11 % 16.75 % 25.45 % 27.53 %
Firm size: 
 5 employees 56.21 % 50.35 % — —
5 to 99 employees 41.12 % 46.43 % 92.18 % 92.07 %
100 to 999 employees 2.45 % 2.95 % 7.21 % 7.31 %
1000  employees 0.22 % 0.27 % 0.61 % 0.61 %
HC quartiles: 
lowest — — 27.10 26.92 %
highest — — 25.75 25.88 %
Workers: 
% prime age 70.97 % 71.57 % 71.08 % 71.38 %
% female 46.37 % 46.14 % 47.77 % 47.57 %
% foreign born 19.04 % 18.70 % 16.78 % 16.64 %
% white, non-Hispanic 71.65 % 72.23 % 71.26 % 71.82 %
Relative labor productivity: 
deviation of log (productivity) 
from 2-digit SIC mean — — 0.0461 0.0809
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) 0.4063 0.3289 0.2886 0.2682
Notes: The observations are on an EIN/state level. All variables are measured in 1997, except where
noted otherwise.Churning Regressions
Existing work, based primarily on household data, has established that
there is a strong negative association between rates of employee turnover
and beneﬁts. We present churning regressions here in part to conﬁrm that
this is true in our ﬁrm-based data as well, but also because our data allow
us to address several unanswered questions. One advantage we have is that
including the ﬁrm wage premium allows us to control for diﬀerences in
other parts of ﬁrm compensation schemes. We also have richer measures
of worker skill and more accurate measures of employer characteristics
than are typically available from household survey data.
Table 13.5 presents the results from our analysis of churning rates for the
ﬁrst quarter of 1997.16 We exclude observations with churning rates of
greater than 2 as likely to be subject to measurement error. Column (1) in-
cludes a dummy for whether or not the ﬁrm oﬀered beneﬁts in 1997 along
with controls for the following ﬁrm characteristics: the wage premium or
ﬁrm wage eﬀect (ψ), size, age, industry, state, and workforce demographic
characteristics. In column (2) we add human capital characteristics, while
columns (3) and (4) repeat those two speciﬁcations, but with more detailed
beneﬁt dummies.
In all speciﬁcations, beneﬁts in general are negatively related to churn-
ing rates. In column (1), ﬁrms that currently oﬀer beneﬁts have about a 3
percentage point lower churning rate (in a sample with a mean churning
rate of 28.9 percent). In column (2), adding human capital characteristics
substantially reduces the size of the beneﬁt coeﬃcient, though it remains
negative and signiﬁcant. Thus, a substantial part of the negative associa-
tion between beneﬁts and churning is because businesses that employ
workers with higher human capital levels are more likely to oﬀer beneﬁts
and higher human capital levels are associated with reduced churning. In-
cluding dummies for speciﬁc beneﬁt types in columns (3) and (4) in place
of the general beneﬁts dummy shows that the negative correlation with
churning is common to all types of pensions plans and to health plans, but
that DB and other (non-DC) pension plans have the most substantial and
consistently negative associations with churning. A comparison of (3) and
(4) shows that the negative association is reduced for all types of plans
when the human capital measures are included, implying that an impor-
tant component of the correlation found in (3) for all beneﬁts is that more
skilled (and higher paid) employees are more likely to be oﬀered beneﬁts.
We ﬁnd somewhat odd results for ﬁrm size: churning rates are signiﬁ-
cantly higher for the 100 to 999 employee and 1000  employee groups of
ﬁrms than for the smallest category, though the largest category has
slightly lower rates than the middle category. Note that we are controlling
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16. We have estimated analogous regressions using churning measures from the 1st quar-
ter of 2001, and get very similar results so we have not presented them here.for ﬁrm age here, and the age eﬀects are quite large, so it is not the case that
large, well-established ﬁrms have higher churning rates than young, small
ﬁrms. The fact that we are looking at churning over a very short period of
time (one quarter) may contribute to this result, as small ﬁrms are much
more likely to have a churning rate of zero in a quarter than is a ﬁrm with
1,000 employees.
One interesting result is that the inclusion of the human capital variables
reduces the coeﬃcient for DC plans much more than the coeﬃcient for DB
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Table 13.5 Churning regressions: 1st quarter of 1997
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬀered beneﬁts in 1997 –.0279 –.0045 — —
(.0013) (.0012) — —
Oﬀered DB pension plan in 1997 — — –.0287 –.0185
— — (.0033) (.0032)
Oﬀered DC pension plan in 1997 — — –.0246 –.0031
— — (.0014) (.0014)
Oﬀered other pension in 1997 — — –.0400 –.0218
— — (.0061) (.0059)
Oﬀered health plan in 1997 — — –.0165 –.0083
— — (.0028) (.0027)
Oﬀered other fringe plan in 1997 — — –.0056 .0026
— — (.0018) (.0017)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) –.1029 –.0842 –.1018 –.0838
(.0016) (.0017) (.0016) (.0017)
Multi-unit ﬁrm .0299 .0173 .0313 .0178
(.0022) (.0021) (.0022) (.0021)
Firm age 5 to   10 –.0703 –.0662 –.0705 –.0664
(.0016) (.0015) (.0016) (.0015)
Firm age 10 to   15 –.0990 –.0914 –.0993 –.0915
(.0017) (.0016) (.0017) (.0016)
Firm age 15 to   20 –.1206 –.1120 –.1204 –.1118
(.0018) (.0018) (.0018) (.0018)
Firm age 20 or more –.1371 –.1312 –.1356 –.1304
(.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016)
Firm size 100 to 999 employees .0913 .0724 .0970 .0752
(.0022) (.0021) (.0023) (.0022)
Firm size 1000  employees .0797 .0651 .0947 .0729
(.0068) (.0066) (.0069) (.0068)
% in lowest HC quartile — .1367 — .1363
— (.0038) — (.0038)
% in highest HC quartile — –.1598 — –.1594
— (.0038) — (.0038)
R-squared .150 .196 0.151 0.196
Notes: N   390,635. Dependent variable is the churning rate for the ﬁrst quarter of 1997, as
deﬁned in footnote 15; mean   .289. Sample is 1997 ﬁrms with churning rates of less than 2.
Regressions also include controls for state, two-digit industry, and worker demographics. All
controls measured in 1997.plans. This suggests that selection on the human capital characteristics
that are consistently valued across employers (i.e., those captured by the in-
dividual ﬁxed eﬀects) is more important in explaining the lower turnover
associated with DC plans than the turnover associated with DB plans.
These results ﬁt nicely with the pension literature’s emphasis on the incen-
tive eﬀects of DB plans—high costs imposed on separations lead to re-
duced turnover—and with the observation that the similarly low turnover
rates for DC plans probably have a diﬀerent cause, namely selection eﬀects.
Firm Growth
In table 13.6 we examine how ﬁrm growth is correlated with beneﬁt pro-
vision. The sample consists of ﬁrms that were in existence in both 1997 and
2001. We regress the log diﬀerence in employment on beneﬁts dummies,
while controlling for characteristics of the ﬁrm and its workforce. In col-
umn (1) we simply control for whether a ﬁrm oﬀers beneﬁts in 1997, while
in (2) we distinguish whether or not beneﬁts are oﬀered in 1997 only, in
2001 only, or in 1997 and 2001, leaving ﬁrms that oﬀered beneﬁts in neither
year as the omitted category. In columns (3) and (4) we repeat these speci-
ﬁcations with the addition of a control for labor productivity.
Overall, the continuers’ sample has a negative growth rate: employment
shrinks on average by about 4 percentage points over the period. Our re-
gression results in columns (1) and (3) show that ﬁrms that oﬀered beneﬁts
in 1997 grew more over the subsequent period than those that did not, con-
ditional on surviving to 2001. Firms that oﬀered beneﬁts in both years
grew substantially faster than those that oﬀered them in neither: their
growth rates were about 11 percentage points greater than the omitted cat-
egory and that diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. Changes in beneﬁts are also corre-
lated with ﬁrm growth, though it seems more likely that ﬁrms’ choices to
change their beneﬁts were motivated by their growth experience than the
converse. Firms that dropped beneﬁts between 1997 and 2001 had growth
rates that were on average about 3 percentage points lower than those of
ﬁrms that did not oﬀer beneﬁts in either year in both columns (2) and (4).
Firms that added beneﬁts had growth rates that were about 25 percentage
points higher than those for ﬁrms that oﬀered beneﬁts in neither year.
The other coeﬃcients make clear that older ﬁrms and larger ﬁrms, un-
surprisingly, grow more slowly. Firms with high churning rates also tend to
grow more slowly. One might expect that, other characteristics constant,
ﬁrms that are growing quickly would have high churning rates, as increas-
ing the number of employees requires increasing the proportion with low
tenure, and low tenure employees tend to have higher turnover rates. How-
ever, high turnover might also hamper desired ﬁrm growth. The negative
coeﬃcient suggests that the latter is likely the predominate eﬀect.
The coeﬃcients on the human capital measures indicate that employing
many less-skilled workers is associated with lower growth rates. The coeﬃ-
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tionship between average human capital and ﬁrm growth, but the coeﬃ-
cients are much smaller. When we add the productivity measure in (3) and
(4) this coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant and, in column (4), even negative
so it appears that having high human capital employees is associated with
greater ﬁrm growth only because it is associated with higher productivity.
Once that is controlled for, the association is insigniﬁcant or negative, per-
haps because of their cost.
The ﬁrm wage eﬀect has a strong positive relationship with growth
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Table 13.6 Firm employment growth regressions
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬀered beneﬁts in 1997 .0470 — .0372 —
(.0026) — (.0026) —
Oﬀered beneﬁts in 1997 only — –.0259 — –.0305
— (.0041) — (.0041)
Oﬀered beneﬁts in 2001 only — .2612 — .2538
— (.0052) — (.0052)
Oﬀered beneﬁts in both years — .1098 — .0982
— (.0029) — (.0029)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) .1303 .1098 .0722 .0566
(.0035) (.0035) (.0038) (.0038)
Multi-unit ﬁrm –.1917 –.1975 –.1928 –.1984
(.0044) (.0044) (.0044) (.0044)
Firm age 5 to   10 –.0724 –.0701 –.0741 –.0717
(.0034) (.0034) (.0034) (.0034)
Firm age 10 to   15 –.0989 –.0970 –.1006 –.0987
(.0035) (.0035) (.0035) (.0035)
Firm age 15 to   20 –.1181 –.1180 –.1190 –.1188
(.0038) (.0037) (.0038) (.0037)
Firm age 20 or more –.1381 –.1410 –.1392 –.1419
(.0034) (.0034) (.0034) (.0034)
Firm size 100 to 999 employees –.0030 –.0162 –.0042 –.0168
(.0045) (.0045) (.0045) (.0045)
Firm size 1000  employees –.0286 –.0390 –.0325 –.0421
(.0140) (.0139) (.0139) (.0139)
% in lowest HC quartile –.1550 –.1372 –.1134 –.0990
(.0082) (.0082) (.0083) (.0082)
% in highest HC quartile .0675 .0461 .0018 –.0140
(.0079) (.0079) (.0081) (.0080)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) –.0641 –0.0675 –.0534 –.0575
(.0036) (.0035) (.0036) (.0035)
Relative labor productivity (log) — — .0698 .0647
— — (.0017) (.0017)
R-squared 0.0377 0.0485 .0430 .0531
Notes: N   302,079. Dependent variable is the log diﬀerence in employment: ln(Emp2001) –
(ln(Emp1997); mean   –.04. Sample is all ﬁrms continuing from 1997 to 2001 with churning
rates  2. The regressions also include controls for state, two-digit industry, and worker de-
mographic characteristics in 1997.rates—ﬁrms that paid 10 percent more than the average had about 1.3 per-
centage point higher growth in column (1). This coeﬃcient is also sensitive
to the inclusion of productivity in the regressions. It is substantially smaller
in columns (3) and (4), but remains positive. So higher paying ﬁrms grew
faster over this period, in part because high productivity ﬁrms were grow-
ing faster, and high productivity and the ﬁrm component of pay are posi-
tively correlated.
For table 13.7 we substitute more detailed beneﬁt dummies for the gen-
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Table 13.7 Firm employment growth regressions with type of plan controls
Independent variables (1) (2)
Oﬀered DB pension plan in 1997 –.0619 –.0758
(.0065) (.0065)
Oﬀered DC pension plan in 1997 .0388 .0290
(.0028) (.0028)
Oﬀered other pension in 1997 .0852 .0787
(.0119) (.0118)
Oﬀered health plan in 1997 .0162 .0083
(.0057) (.0057)
Oﬀered other fringe plan in 1997 .0323 .0319
(.0035) (.0035)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) .1311 .0728
(.0035) (.0038)
Multi-unit ﬁrm –.1920 –.1924
(.0044) (.0044)
Firm age 5 to   10 –.0723 –.0741
(.0034) (.0034)
Firm age 10 to   15 –.0987 –.1005
(.0035) (.0035)
Firm age 15 to   20 –.1173 –.1180
(.0038) (.0038)
Firm age 20 or more –.1368 –.1372
(.0034) (.0034)
Firm size 100 to 999 employees –.0077 –.0064
(.0047) (.0047)
Firm size 1000  employees –.0314 –.0286
(.0143) (.0142)
% in lowest HC quartile –.1542 –.1125
(.0082) (.0083)
% in highest HC quartile .0703 .0044
(.0079) (.0081)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) –.0643 –.0537
(.0036) (.0036)
Relative labor productivity (log) — .0707
— (.0017)
R-squared .038 .044
Notes: N   302,079. Dependent variable is the log diﬀerence in employment; mean   –.04.
Sample is all ﬁrms continuing from 1997 to 2001. The regressions include controls for state,
two-digit SIC, and worker demographics. All control variables are measured as of 1997.eral beneﬁt variable in table 13.6, columns (1) and (3). The coeﬃcients on
the control variables that are common to the two tables are very similar in
the two tables. However, there are some striking diﬀerences in coeﬃcients
across diﬀerent types of beneﬁts. Firms that oﬀered DB pension plans had
employment losses that were signiﬁcantly larger than those for ﬁrms with-
out beneﬁts. DB pensions plans are most typically oﬀered by larger, older
employers in more established parts of the economy (e.g., manufacturing),
but we ﬁnd this result even after controlling for age, size, and two-digit in-
dustry. Thus, oﬀering a DB plan may be correlated with being in shrinking
parts of the economy even within industry and age class. The other types
of beneﬁt plans are all positively associated with employment growth, with
the largest coeﬃcients for ‘other’ pension plans. Health plans have a posi-
tive but relatively small coeﬃcient in column (1), which becomes insigniﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero in column (2), where we control for productivity
diﬀerences.
13.4.2 Relationship to Productivity
At this point, we do not have changes in productivity to use to directly
examine the relationship between post-1997 productivity growth and ben-
eﬁt oﬀering in 1997, so we instead look at the cross-sectional relationship.
In table 13.8, the dependent variable is the log of labor productivity devi-
ated from a two-digit industry-speciﬁc mean. The unit of observation is
generally a ﬁrm/state record; that is, a multi-unit ﬁrm that operates in sev-
eral of the states for which we have data will have more than one record.
Some of the variables included are deﬁned for the ﬁrm as a whole (whether
or not beneﬁts are oﬀered, ﬁrm size, multi-unit status, and ﬁrm age), while
the others are generally measured within state.17
Our primary interest is in the coeﬃcient on the beneﬁts indicator, which
is positive and signiﬁcant in each of our speciﬁcations. We recognize that
several of our right-hand variables are likely endogenous, so the results
should be interpreted simply as establishing correlations rather than causal-
ity. Because the dependent variable is a log diﬀerence, the coeﬃcient on this
variable in column 1 indicates that the productivity of ﬁrms that oﬀer ben-
eﬁts is on average .32 log points (or roughly 38 percent) higher than that of
nonbeneﬁt-oﬀering ﬁrms with similar characteristics. Given that beneﬁts
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17. The level of aggregation is important only for multi-unit ﬁrms that have diverse opera-
tions within a state. Because of the computational resources needed to estimate the wage de-
composition, our decisions about how to handle aggregation issues are in part driven by the
availability of estimates originally generated for other projects. The labor productivity and
capital measures are calculated at a state/EIN/two-digit SIC level, and then a single two-digit
SIC record is selected (if more than one exists) by taking the record with the highest payroll.
The demographic and churning variables were handled similarly, except that the original mea-
sures were calculated at a state/EIN level. The human capital and ﬁrm eﬀect variables are cal-
culated at the state/EIN/two-digit SIC level. For these measures we use the observation with
the highest employment because payroll is not available in these ﬁles.are costly, it would be diﬃcult for beneﬁt-oﬀering ﬁrms to stay competitive
if they did not have higher labor productivity, so this is reassuring.
In column (2), we add controls for the ﬁrm’s distribution of worker hu-
man capital. The ﬁrst human capital variable gives the percent of the work-
force with a worker ﬁxed-eﬀect in the bottom quartile of the distribution;
the second gives the percent in the top quartile. Both of these variables have
large, signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of the expected sign—productivity rises with
the fraction of workers in the more skilled parts of the distribution. In-
cluding these controls reduces the beneﬁts coeﬃcient by about .06 log
points, indicating that about a ﬁfth of the association between productiv-
ity and beneﬁts found in the ﬁrst column is explained by this fairly simple
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Table 13.8 1997 Productivity diﬀerentials associated with beneﬁt oﬀering
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Oﬀers beneﬁts in 1997 .3218 .2572 .1488 .0454 .0481
(.0028) (.0027) (.0025) (.0144) (.0137)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) — — .8277 1.0185 .8279
— — (.0034) (.0321) (.0310)
Multi-unit ﬁrm .0111 .0252 .0214 .0437 .0269
(.0048) (.0046) (.0043) (.0187) (.0177)
Firm age 5 to  10 .0342 .0269 .0385 .1916 .1732
(.0035) (.0034) (.0031) (.0257) (.0244)
Firm age 10 to  15 .0517 .0341 .0415 .1687 .1250
(.0037) (.0036) (.0033) (.0241) (.0229)
Firm age 15 to  20 .0647 .0374 .0349 .1492 .1050
(.0040) (.0039) (.0036) (.0248) (.0236)
Firm age 20 or more .0867 .0501 .0345 .1579 .0973
(.0036) (.0035) (.0033) (.0197) (.0188)
Firm size 100 to 999 employees .0157 .0400 .0152 .1191 .0881
(.0048) (.0047) (.0044) (.0158) (.0150)
Firm size 1000  employees .1102 .1079 .0612 .1998 .1242
(.0151) (.0146) (.0135) (.0345) (.0328)
% in lowest HC quartile — –.5360 –.6111 –.7937 –.6171
— (.0084) (.0078) (.0594) (.0566)
% in highest HC quartile of — .8372 .9208 .5223 .4046
— (.0082) (.0077) (.0530) (.0504)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) — — –.1670 –.1286 –.1184
— — (.0033) (.0271) (.0257)
Log(capital intensity) ———— .1899
———— (.0057)
Sample All All All ASM ASM
R-squared 0.131 0.187 0.302 0.306 0.374
Notes: N   390,635 for overall sample; N   10,263 for ASM sample. The dependent variable
is the deviation of the log of labor productivity from two-digit SIC mean; mean   .046 for
overall sample,   .331 for ASM sample. All columns also include controls for two-digit SIC,
state, and worker demographics.characterization of worker human capital. In all columns we control for
diﬀerences in productivity associated with industry, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age,
state, and worker demographics.18 The coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm size indica-
tors are positive, signiﬁcant, and generally increasing with size in the over-
all sample. Firms that are more than ﬁve years old have about 3 to 9 per-
cent higher productivity in the overall sample, and about 10 to 19 percent
higher productivity in manufacturing, but the diﬀerences between age
groups among those older than ﬁve are generally not signiﬁcant in manu-
facturing.
In the third column, we add the ﬁrm wage eﬀect and a measure of work-
force churning as additional controls. Across speciﬁcations, the churning
measure has a negative coeﬃcient that is usually signiﬁcant, but whether
or not it is included has little eﬀect on the beneﬁts coeﬃcient.19 Adding the
ﬁrm wage eﬀect, however, reduces the beneﬁts coeﬃcient substantially.
While ﬁrms that oﬀer beneﬁts have higher productivity, they also have
compensation policies that pay what appear to be equivalent workers more
than they receive in other jobs, and this component of pay has a very strong
positive relationship to productivity, even when controlling for workforce
composition.
The fourth and ﬁfth columns present results for the subset of our overall
sample that is included in the 1997 Annual Survey of Manufactures. This
subsample is of interest because we can construct measures of capital that
are not available outside manufacturing.20 Column (4) includes the same
controls as column 3—it is included to illustrate changes in coeﬃcients that
are simply a result of the change in sample. The beneﬁts coeﬃcient is
smaller in manufacturing, but in general the results do not look radically
diﬀerent. Adding our measure of capital—the log of capital per worker,
based on the book value of capital divided by employment—has only a
small eﬀect on the beneﬁts coeﬃcient. Interestingly, it does reduce the size
of the coeﬃcients on the human capital, ﬁrm wage eﬀect, and most demo-
graphic variables, so greater capital intensity does appear to account for
some of the positive association found between worker skill and produc-
tivity.
Table 13.9 reports the results of the productivity regressions with de-
tailed beneﬁt type dummies in place of the overall dummy. While for the
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18. We do not report the worker demographic coeﬃcients in the tables to conserve space.
19. The order in which we introduce the human capital and ﬁrm eﬀect controls has little im-
pact on the portion of the reduction in the beneﬁts coeﬃcient that we attribute to the diﬀer-
ent controls.
20. We can construct capital measures for a larger sample of manufacturing ﬁrms by also
including those that are in the 1997 Economic Census of Manufacturing (CM) but not in the
ASM, which adds a lot of smaller ﬁrms. However, the ASM sample is asked more detailed
capital questions, and imputation is used for some components of capital in non-ASM cases.
We have run the same sets of regressions for both manufacturing samples, and while the co-
eﬃcients are somewhat diﬀerent, the general conclusions we draw are not.employment growth regressions the coeﬃcients on the other control vari-
ables were little changed when we switched to detailed beneﬁts controls,
here we see one notable change between the two tables: the coeﬃcients on
the size dummies in the overall sample go from positive and signiﬁcant to
negative, though only occasionally signiﬁcant. This seems likely due to
larger, more productive ﬁrms in the overall sample oﬀering more than one
The Role of Fringe Beneﬁts in Employer and Workforce Dynamics 495
Table 13.9 1997 Productivity diﬀerentials associated with diﬀerent types of beneﬁt oﬀering
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Oﬀered DB pension plan in 1997 .2981 .2608 .2011 .0976 .0699
(.0072) (.0070) (.0065) (.0211) (.0201)
Oﬀered DC pension plan in 1997 .2976 .2367 .1434 .0223 .0282
(.0030) (.0030) (.0028) (.0153) (.0146)
Oﬀered other pension in 1997 .2044 .1510 .0905 .0529 .0324
(.0135) (.0131) (.0121) (.0764) (.0726)
Oﬀered health plan in 1997 .1348 .1372 .1070 .0336 .0160
(.0062) (.0060) (.0056) (.0187) (.0178)
Oﬀered other fringe plan in 1997 .0556 .0418 .0071 –.0220 –.0160
(.0039) (.0037) (.0035) (.0157) (.0149)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) — — .8207 1.0009 .8187
— — (.0034) (.0322) (.0311)
Multi-unit ﬁrm –.0032 .0116 .0113 .0327 .0197
(.0048) (.0046) (.0043) (.0188) (.0179)
Firm age 5 to  10 .0371 .0294 .0399 .1998 .1802
(.0035) (.0033) (.0031) (0.256) (.0244)
Firm age 10 to  15 .0555 .0372 .0430 .1826 .1371
(.0037) (.0036) (.0033) (.0241) (.0229)
Firm age 15 to  20 .0637 .0361 .0327 .1630 .1175
(.0040) (.0039) (.0036) (.0247) (.0235)
Firm age 20 or more .0738 .0380 .0242 .1588 .1013
(.0036) (.0035) (.0033) (.0196) (.0187)
Firm size 100 to 999 employees –.0293 –.0042 –.0180 .1059 .0826
(.0050) (.0049) (.0045) (.0166) (.0157)
Firm size 1000  employees –.0150 –.0088 –.0253 .1682 .1067
(.0153) (.0148) (.0137) (.0355) (.0338)
% in lowest HC quartile of — –.5314 –.6067 –.7864 –.6154
— (.0084) (.0078) (.0594) (.0567)
% in highest HC quartile — .8294 .9125 .5185 .4042
— (.0082) (.0077) (.0530) (.0505)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) — — –.1654 –.1258 –.1171
— — (.0033) (.0271) (.0257)
Log(capital intensity) — — — — .1884
— — — — (.0057)
Sample All All All ASM ASM
R-squared 0.137 0.192 0.306 0.308 0.375
Notes: N   390,635 for overall sample; N   10,263 for ASM sample. The dependent variable is the de-
viation of the log of labor productivity from two-digit SIC mean; mean  .046 for overall sample,  .331
for ASM sample. All columns also include controls for two-digit SIC, state, and worker demographics.type of beneﬁt or being more likely to oﬀer the types of beneﬁts most highly
correlated with productivity.
The pension coeﬃcients in table 13.9 are all positive and signiﬁcant.
Adding the human capital controls and then the churning rate and ﬁrm
wage eﬀect each reduces the size of the pension coeﬃcients somewhat, but
they all remain quite large in the general sample. Each type of pension is
positively correlated with employee human capital and ﬁrm pay practices,
and negatively correlated with turnover, which account for some but not all
of their positive association with productivity. But it is interesting that the
decreases are larger for the non-DB pension plans than for DB plans. As
was the case with table 13.8, the estimated diﬀerences are smaller in man-
ufacturing but they remain positive. The coeﬃcients for oﬀering health
and fringe plans are positive and signiﬁcant for the overall sample, but
smaller than the pension coeﬃcients. In manufacturing, the health plan
coeﬃcient loses its signiﬁcance and the other fringe plan coeﬃcient be-
comes negative, though not signiﬁcantly so.
13.4.3 Hazard Estimates of Firm Failure
Do ﬁrms that currently oﬀer beneﬁts have higher future survival rates,
conditioning on other observable characteristics? Why might there be such
a relationship? Including beneﬁts as part of compensation is correlated
with having a more stable workforce, and a more stable workforce may 
reduce the likelihood that a ﬁrm goes out of business. However, if beneﬁts
are of more value to employees when they expect their current employer to
stay in business, or if an employer’s gain to oﬀering beneﬁts accrues over a
long period of time, then employers who are less likely to stay in business
may also be less likely to oﬀer beneﬁts. At this point, little is known about
whether such a relationship even exists, so our goal here is simply to de-
scribe the empirical relationship rather than to establish causality. We do
so using our complete sample of ﬁrms in existence in 1997 and exploiting
their rates of failure over the 1997 to 2003 period. A ﬁrm is measured as
having failed if it stops ﬁling the UI records that underlie our human cap-
ital estimates. To examine this relationship, we use a Cox proportional haz-
ard model to estimate the probability of a ﬁrm failing in the years after
1997, conditional on surviving until 1997, and include a dummy variable
for having oﬀered beneﬁts in 1997.21 In addition to beneﬁts, in all speciﬁ-
cations we also include controls for ﬁrm age, industry, state, multi-unit sta-
tus, ﬁrm size, and workforce demographics. We measure all of these ex-
planatory variables as of 1997. While alternative functional forms could be
used here—for example, a probit—the hazard model takes advantage of
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21. By using a conditional probability function, the Cox proportional hazard method con-
trols for left truncation/delayed entry (ﬁrms are ﬁrst observed in 1997, but were already in
business before). Only observations from 1997 and onward are used in calculating the log-
likelihood function.variation in the timing of failure as well as whether or not a failure occurred
at some point in the six year period for which we have data.
We present four sets of estimates: tables 13.10 and 13.11 give results for
the overall sample, ﬁrst using the general beneﬁts dummy (13.10) and then
using dummies for plan type (13.11). In tables 13.12 and 13.13, we restrict
our sample to ﬁrms with at least 100 employees. Recall that for some types
of beneﬁts (primarily health plans) sponsors are not required to ﬁle a Form
5500 if the plan has fewer than 100 enrollees, and thus we measure beneﬁts
coverage less accurately for smaller ﬁrms, which are excluded in these
tables. The speciﬁcations (2), (3), and (4) for each table diﬀer from (1) in
that we progressively add the human capital quartile measures and the ﬁrm
wage eﬀect (ψ), the churning measure, and then labor productivity.
In all speciﬁcations in tables 13.10 and 13.11, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant nega-
The Role of Fringe Beneﬁts in Employer and Workforce Dynamics 497
Table 13.10 Hazard estimates of the relationship between ﬁrm death and beneﬁt
oﬀering: All ﬁrms, 1997–2003
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬀers beneﬁt in 1997 –.2315 –.2084 –.2068 –.1853
(.0077) (.0079) (.0079) (.0079)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) — .0448 .0747 .2009
— (.0098 (.0100) (.0110)
Multi-unit ﬁrm –.0227 –.0288 –.0314 –.0281
(.0128) (.0128) (.0127) (.0127)
Firm age 5 to  10 –.4595 –.4579 –.4504 –.4492
(.0118) (.0118) (.0118) (.0118)
Firm age 10 to  15 –.8975 –.8942 –.8834 –.8835
(.0189) (.0189) (.0189) (.0189)
Firm age 15 to  20 –1.4074 –1.4021 –1.3883 –1.3910
(.0266) (.0266) (.0266) (.0266)
Firm age 20 or more –1.6950 –1.6912 –1.6744 –1.6719
(.0321) (.0321) (.0321) (.0321)
Firm size 100 to 999 employees .1985 .1817 .1559 .1550
(.0125) (.0126) (.0125) (.0126)
Firm size 1000  employees .1926 .1839 .1599 .1663
(.0403) (.0403) (.0404) (.0405)
% in lowest HC quartile — .0706 .0326 –.0598
— (.0213) (.0215) (.0218)
% in highest HC quartile — –.4806 –.4314 –.2973
— (.0235) (.0236) (.0241)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) — — .2838 .2591
— — (.0083) (.0084)
Relative labor productivity (log) — — — –.1482
— — — (.0051)
Notes: Number of EIN/State observations   389,051. Number of failures   107,652. Haz-
ards also include controls for state, two-digit SIC, and workforce demographic characteris-
tics. All controls are measured in 1997.tive relationship between the likelihood of post-1997 ﬁrm failure and the
provision of beneﬁts, with the notable exception of health insurance. The co-
eﬃcients on the overall beneﬁt dummy in table 13.10 indicate that the 
hazard of ﬁrm death is on average roughly 20 percent lower for ﬁrms that
provide beneﬁts, with the size of the relationship somewhat smaller in spec-
iﬁcations with additional controls. In 13.11 where we examine diﬀerent
types of beneﬁts we ﬁnd similarly sized coeﬃcients for DC pension plans,
and even larger ones for other (i.e., non-DC/non-DB) pensions. The DB
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Table 13.11 Hazard estimates with plan type controls: All ﬁrms, 1997–2003
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬀered DB pension plan in 1997 –.0888 –.0750 –.0686 –.0383
(.0215) (.0216) (.0216) (.0216)
Oﬀered DC pension plan in 1997 –.2465 –.2213 –.2208 –.1989
(.0086) (.0088) (.0088) (.0088)
Oﬀered other pension in 1997 –.4586 –.4400 –.4317 –.4220
(.0490) (.0490) (.0489) (.0489)
Oﬀered health plan in 1997 .3268 .3232 .3283 .3410
(.0167) (.0167) (.0167) (.0167)
Oﬀered other fringe plan in 1997 –.0471 –.0431 –.0432 –.0409
(.0108) (.0108) (.0108) (.0108)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) — .0353 .0651 .1931
— (.0098) (.0100) (.0110)
Multi-unit ﬁrm –.0352 –.0416 –.0447 –.0425
(.0128) (.0128) (.0128) (.0128)
Firm age 5 to  10 –.4615 –.4599 –.4523 –.4511
(.0118) (.0118) (.0118) (.0118)
Firm age 10 to  15 –.9011 –.8977 –.8869 –.8871
(.0189) (.0189) (.0189) (.0189)
Firm age 15 to  20 –1.4119 –1.4065 –1.3928 –1.396
(.0266) (.0266) (.0266) (.0266)
Firm age 20 or more –1.7193 –1.7161 –1.7003 –1.7002
(.0322) (.0321) (.0321) (.0322)
Firm size 100 to 999 employees .1260 .1105 .0844 .0797
(.0133) (.0133) (.0133) (.0133)
Firm size 1000  employees .0842 .0755 .0485 .0431
(.0415) (.0415) (.0414) (.0416)
% in lowest HC quartile — .0838 .0458 –.0478
— (.0214) (.0216) (.0241)
% in highest HC quartile — –.4807 –.4314 –.2958
— (.0236) (.0237) (.0241)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) — — .2853 .2603
— — (.0083) (.0084)
Relative labor productivity (log) — — — –.1514
— — — (.0051)
Notes: Number of EIN/State observations   388,814. Number of failures   107,583. Haz-
ards also include controls for state, two-digit SIC, and workforce demographics. All controls
are measured in 1997.plans and other fringe plans have smaller but still negative and generally
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Health plans, however, have large positive coeﬃ-
cients, indicating that on average ﬁrms that are matched to a health plan
have about a 33 percent higher failure rate than similar ﬁrms that do not
match to such a plan.
In table 13.12, where we restrict our sample to ﬁrms with 100 or more
employees, the overall beneﬁt dummy coeﬃcients remain negative and sig-
niﬁcant, and increase slightly in magnitude. Similar comments apply to the
coeﬃcients on detailed beneﬁt types in table 13.13—there are no changes
in sign and the coeﬃcients often (though not always) increase in magni-
tude, but again with the notable exception of health plans. The health plan
coeﬃcients remain positive, but drop dramatically in size to imply only a
ﬁve to six percent higher hazard rate for ﬁrms that oﬀer health plans. Thus,
it is mostly among small ﬁrms that we ﬁnd dramatically higher failure rates
for ﬁrms that match to a Form 5500 health plan. Particularly with health
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Table 13.12 Hazard estimates of ﬁrm death and beneﬁt oﬀering: Firms with 100 or
more employees, 1997–2003
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬀers beneﬁt in 1997 –.2708 –.2887 –.2820 –.2808
(.0234) (.0236) (.0236) (.0236)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) — .4665 .5348 .6778
— (.0631) (.0647) (.0704)
Multi-unit ﬁrm –.0089 –.0105 –.0085 –.0035
(.0247) (.0247) (.0247) (.0248)
Firm age 5 to  10 –.3748 –.3730 –.3656 –.3607
(.0617) (.0617) (.0618) (.0617)
Firm age 10 to  15 –.7543 –.7511 –.7353 –.7304
(.0863) (.0863) (.0863) (.0863)
Firm age 15 to  20 –1.4061 –1.4056 –1.3852 –1.3838
(.1108) (.1108) (.1109) (.1109)
Firm age 20 or more –1.6064 –1.6151 –1.5912 –1.5895
(.1189) (.1190) (.1191) (.1190)
Firm size 1000  employees –.0807 –.0985 –.1005 –.0977
(.0425) (.0429) (.0429) (.0429)
% in lowest HC quartile — .0607 –.0223 –.1030
— (.1215) (.1228) (.1233)
% in highest HC quartile — .1464 .1554 .2299
— (.1051) (.1052) (.1057)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) — — .2419 .2168
— — (.0394) (.0397)
Relative labor productivity (log) — — — –.1092
— — — (.0177)
Notes: Number of EIN/State observations   30,191. Number of failures   8,498. Hazards
also include controls for state, two-digit SIC, and workforce demographic characteristics. All
controls are measured in 1997.plans, the diﬀerence in results between the two samples may be an artifact
of ﬁling rules. Recall that for small health plans, only plans that are at least
partially self-insured must ﬁle. While the majority of self-insured plans use
stop-loss coverage to limit their ﬁnancial risk, it must still be a fairly risky
strategy for small ﬁrms to forgo full insurance when providing health ben-
eﬁts. If ﬁrms that choose risky strategies in providing beneﬁts are also more
likely to take risks in other areas, it may not be surprising that they would
be more likely to fail, particularly when the comparison group must in-
clude some ﬁrms that oﬀer health insurance but fully insure.
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Table 13.13 Hazard estimates with plan type controls: Firms with 100  employees,
1997–2003
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Oﬀered DB pension plan in 1997 –.1113 –.1311 –.1309 –.1199
(.0384) (.0386) (.0386) (.0387)
Oﬀered DC pension plan in 1997 –.2037 –.2128 –.2112 –.2117
(.0259) (.0259) (.0260) (.0260)
Oﬀered other pension in 1997 –.5753 –.5774 –.5716 –.5705
(.0955) (.0955) (.0956) (.0955)
Oﬀered health plan in 1997 .0633 .0479 .0539 .0549
(.0273) (.0274) (.0275) (.0275)
Oﬀered other fringe plan in 1997 –.1164 –.1190 –.1179 –.1167
(.0251) (.0251) (.0251) (.0251)
Firm wage eﬀect (ψ) — .4715 .5403 .6764
— (.0639) (.0654) (.0710)
Multi-unit ﬁrm –.0090 –.0088 –.0071 –.0029
(.0248) (.0248) (.0248) (.0248)
Firm age 5 to  10 –.3865 –.3848 –.3772 –.3724
(.0618) (.0618) (.0619) (.0618)
Firm age 10 to  15 –.7653 –.7625 –.7469 –.7417
(.0864) (.0865) (.0865) (.0865)
Firm age 15 to  20 –1.4137 –1.4131 –1.3927 –1.3908
(.1110) (.1110) (.1111) (.1111)
Firm age 20 or more –1.6020 –1.6080 –1.5845 –1.5836
(.1192) (.1192) (.1193) (.1192)
Firm size 1000  employees –.0593 –.0729 –.0758 –.0745
(.0431) (.0434) (.0434) (.0434)
% in lowest HC quartile — .0587 –.0255 –.1014
— (.1217) (.1229) (.1234)
% in highest HC quartile — .1806 .1896 .2587
— (.1053) (.1054) (.1059)
Churning rate (1st quarter, 1997) — — .2453 .2215
— — (.0395) (.0397)
Relative labor productivity (log) — — — –.1047
— — — (.0178)
Notes: Number of EIN/State observations   30,129. Number of failures   8,476. Hazards
also include controls for state, two-digit SIC, and workforce demographics. All controls are
measured in 1997.Still, even among the large sample, we ﬁnd a positive association be-
tween health insurance oﬀering and failure, conditioning on all of the
other variables in the regressions. This indicates that it is not only diﬀer-
ences in ﬁling requirements that make health insurance appear so diﬀerent
from the other types of beneﬁts. We can only hypothesize why this might
be so. One possibility is that ﬁrms have more ﬂexibility in oﬀering pension
plans (at least non-DB plans) when they are doing well and dropping them
when business is poor because employees care less about the consistency of
current pension coverage than of health coverage. A very generous plan
this year and none the next may be equivalent to a meager plan both years
to the average worker because they provide the same stream of future con-
sumption. The same is not true for health plans, which may make it more
diﬃcult for ﬁrms to cut health insurance in lean times, and might in turn
lead to a much more negative coeﬃcient in hazard regressions for pension
plans than for health plans. However, it is not clear that this could gener-
ate a positive coeﬃcient for health plans, which is in fact what we ﬁnd.
Unsurprisingly, ﬁrm age has a large and consistently negative associa-
tion with the likelihood of failure, but our size eﬀects are puzzling. We ac-
tually ﬁnd lower rates of failure for ﬁrms with fewer than 100 employees
than for larger ﬁrms in the speciﬁcations in tables 13.10 and 13.11, though
the diﬀerences between medium sized (100 to 999) and very large employ-
ers (1000 ) look more reasonable. The largest ﬁrms have either similar (in
table 13.10) or lower rates of failure (tables 13.11, 13.12, and 13.13), de-
pending on the speciﬁcation. Note that the diﬀerences in hazard rates are
much larger for age than for size. If we do not include age controls, the size
coeﬃcients follow the expected pattern—they are negative and increase in
magnitude with size.
The human capital measures have less consistent eﬀects. In the overall
sample, with either speciﬁcation of beneﬁts controls, ﬁrms with more
skilled workers generally have higher survival rates, though adding pro-
ductivity as a control reduces the size of the eﬀects. However, in the sample
with only larger ﬁrms, the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcients
vary somewhat in sign. With churning and labor productivity controls in
the hazard, the coeﬃcient on the upper quartile of the human capital dis-
tribution in 13.13 is positive and marginally signiﬁcant, implying a higher
rate of failure among ﬁrms that employ a higher proportion of skilled
workers, perhaps because of their cost.
The ﬁrm wage eﬀect, which captures ﬁrm pay diﬀerentials, has a positive
eﬀect in all speciﬁcations, but for the overall sample the eﬀect is quite small
unless we control for labor productivity. Interestingly, the diﬀerence in the
size of the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm wage eﬀect in columns (2) and (3) be-
tween tables 13.10, 13.11, 13.12, and 13.13 suggests that it is only among
small ﬁrms that those with higher average pay have high enough labor pro-
ductivity that they are less likely to fail. For both samples, controlling for
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eﬀect: holding productivity, turnover, and workforce characteristics con-
stant, higher average pay is associated with higher rates of failure. Reas-
suringly, labor productivity has a strong negative correlation with the prob-
ability of failure wherever we include it, while higher churning rates are
positively related to failure rates, as we would expect.
13.5 Summary
Using Form 5500 data combined with LEHD integrated UI data for
1997 to 2003, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that oﬀer beneﬁts have lower turnover rates
and grow faster than the average non-beneﬁt-oﬀering ﬁrm. We examine
diﬀerent types of beneﬁts, and ﬁnd the same general pattern for most types
of plans, with the exception of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans for which we
ﬁnd lower turnover but slower employment growth. Controlling for work-
force human capital characteristics reduces the estimated eﬀects but does
not eliminate them. Firms that add beneﬁts over this period have particu-
larly high rates of employment growth, suggesting that signiﬁcant employ-
ment growth may be a factor in the decision to oﬀer beneﬁts for ﬁrms that
do not already do so.
In our analysis of productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that both
beneﬁts and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of pay are positively related to
productivity. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms that oﬀer beneﬁts are less likely to
fail—even after controlling for other observable characteristics—than are
ﬁrms that do not oﬀer beneﬁts. Many interpretations could be put on this.
One is that of endogeneity—ﬁrms that are more likely to die (either due to
current ﬁnancial problems, or perhaps because they are an inherently more
risky business) are less likely to oﬀer beneﬁts. This could either be as a way
to cut down on current costs, or because workers value beneﬁts less when
the risk of future default is higher.
In general, our ﬁndings verify that there is a correlation between a ﬁrm’s
decision to oﬀer beneﬁts and the mobility and productivity of its labor
force as well as the ﬁrm’s length of life. While our results do not conﬁrm a
causal relationship between beneﬁts and ﬁrm outcomes, they do highlight
the importance of considering both beneﬁts and wages when studying the
labor market decisions made by ﬁrms and workers.
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Table 13A.2 Business register match rates, weighted by employment—1997 and 2001
Single units Multi-units All Firms
Number  of Total Match Total Match Total Match 
employees employment rate (%) employment rate (%) employment rate (%)
A. 1997
1 to 4 5,500,708 5.2 22,244 16.2 5,522,952 5.2
5 to 99 28,665,996 29.5 4,590,771 57.1 33,256,767 33.3
100 to 999 8,987,671 64.1 12,237,687 82.0 21,225,358 74.4
1000  2,366,799 69.5 43,297,297 95.5 45,664,096 94.1
Total 45,521,174 35.5 60,147,999 89.8 105,669,173 66.4
B. 2001
1 to 4 5,604,584 4.2 17,668 16.0 5,622,252 4.2
5 to 99 31,793,403 25.3 3,560,992 51.7 35,354,395 27.9
100 to 999 10,855,284 56.9 11,596,094 78.1 22,451,378 67.9
1000  3,829,941 53.1 51,039,833 94.5 54,869,774 91.6
Total 52,083,212 31.6 66,214,587 89.3 118,297,799 63.9
Appendix
Table 13A.1 Distribution of 5500 plan records by exclusive type
Exclusive beneﬁt plan types Number Percent (%)
Deﬁned beneﬁt plan 64,313 6.00
Deﬁned contribution plan 657,324 61.30
Other pension plan 24,916 2.30
Health plan 65,333 6.10
Fringe beneﬁt plan 208,469 19.40
Welfare and fringe beneﬁt plan 42,851 4.00
Welfare and pension beneﬁt plan 2,915 0.30
No info on plan beneﬁt type 5,899 0.60
Total 1,072,020 100.00References
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Comment Dan A. Black
Decressin, Hill, McCue, and Stinson (DHMS henceforth) should be con-
gratulated for a very good chapter. Moreover, the profession owes them a
debt of gratitude for their eﬀorts to create this intriguing data set. Econo-
mists are heavy users of data sets, but we seem to undervalue the eﬀort and
creativity associated with the creation of data. The authors of this chapter
have done an immense amount of work creating an important data set that
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